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Abstract
This paper suggests that the old (neo-Malthusian) ideological orthodoxy which informed much of
the population policy debate until the mid-1980s is in danger of being replaced by a new
orthodoxy which is also unduly one-sided and simplistic. In addition, this new ideology, which
received such a boost at the Cairo conference, is under even less pressure to re-evaluate some of its
premises because it is motivated by more obviously altruistic and egalitarian concerns, and a
challenge to its premises runs the risk of being interpreted as a challenge to these humane goals.
However, letting ideology inform research and policy can have self-defeating consequences when it
ignores the complexity of the real world, the frequency of trade-offs, and the many ways in which
there may be a conflict between policy-relevant empirical findings and these ideological goals. The
paper explores some of these issues in the context of Cairo and presents a framework which may
be used to develop a constructive critique of the new international population policy agenda.
Traditional population policy received a major drubbing at the United Nations Conference on
Population and Development held in Cairo in 1994. But the Cairo statement was actually the
culmination of a long-simmering discontent with the ideology and methods of traditional
population policy: a discontent that had manifested itself in several forums in the 1980s but
required the political clout of the international women’s movement to enter the public and
policy consciousness.
In many of these critiques, population policy is rightly equated with family planning
policy. In addition, these critiques have often gone further to criticize the ideological and
political underpinnings of traditional population research as well, the main criticism being that
such research was often little more than a means of justifying or legitimizing family planning
policy, or else refining the operational aspects of family planning programs (see, for example,
Hodgson 1983; Demeny 1988; Greenhalgh 1996).
The last ten years therefore have witnessed an accumulation of writing and discussion on
the negative features of traditional population policy and the need for a paradigm shift.
Around and since the Cairo conference, the dominant or at least most visible feature of this
paradigm shift involved a move from notions of population control to notions of reproductive
health. If one sifts through this large and still burgeoning writing, a few distinct strands of
criticism emerge as the key complaints of population policy and its old staple, the family
planning program.
First, family planning programs are driven entirely by demographic goals and targets.
That is, what  they seek is a reduction in population growth rates, with little concern for client
needs and problems, or what is called the ‘user perspective’.
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Secondly, family planning programs are by their very nature coercive and have the
potential to seriously abuse human rights and especially the reproductive rights of women. For
both these reasons, family planning programs need to be replaced by ‘reproductive health
programs’ which replace larger demographic goals with the goals of individual clients.
Thirdly (as mentioned above) the family planning program approach to population policy
is bolstered by an influential chunk of mainstream population research which seems to exist
only to justify the existence of such programs.
Fourth, in addition to providing reproductive health care, the empowerment of women is
the primary ethical and effective way to improve the quality of life of a population (which is,
after all, what population policy is, or at least should be, all about), as well as incidentally to
bring down fertility.
Empirical evidence and philosophical reasoning is sought to back many of these
criticisms. But their most important strength is that they have a strong emotional and human
appeal; they are so obviously born of the concern for individual welfare and individual rights
that appeared to be missing (even if it was not actually missing) from the collective welfare
rationale that often characterized earlier population policy1. This sense of altruism appeared to
be missing from earlier pronouncements on population not only because it was less often
openly professed; it appeared even more to be missing because these earlier pronouncements
had an emotionally distasteful hierarchical element: they smacked too much of the developed
countries telling the developing world what to do, of governments telling people what to do,
and of men telling women what to do. At all these levels, it appeared all too plausible that the
‘teller’ had his own agenda, which could be quite divorced from the welfare and perspective
of the potential ‘doer’.
Population research was often believed to collude in this earlier endeavour to the extent
that its own agenda took the demographic goal of family planning programs for granted and
concerned itself more with elucidating the various ways and the various conditions in which
family planning programs could be made more demographically effective. That this research
endeavour could in turn be motivated by a concern for individual rights and welfare often
tended to get lost in the dry and ‘scientific’ tone of most of the research output in population
studies.
The Cairo conference and the events leading up to it made a signal contribution by
bringing these welfare issues out into the open and by making them the explicit focus of
population policy. However, this paper suggests that the population movement today faces a
real danger of throwing out the baby with the bathwater in its attempt to dissociate itself so
completely from the findings and recommendations of past research and policy. There is
much in this body of research and recommendations that is not inconsistent with the goals of
protecting and promoting human rights and individual welfare; the best way of reconciling the
goals and methods of the old population movement and the new international population
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 But even before the Cairo conference this rationale had increasingly changed to one concerned with
the impact of high fertility on individual and family welfare; an acknowledgement of this change is
missing from much of the current reproductive health literature.
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movement (henceforth referred to as the IPM 2) would be to develop an internal critique of the
latter analogous to the one that was so devastatingly developed of the former3.
If such a critique of the new IPM is not developed, then the new IPM, in spite of its
visibly more laudable motives, stands to become as politicized and one-sided as the old IPM
seemed to be; a situation that then risks advocating and legitimizing ineffective or
occasionally even detrimental policies in the same way as the old IPM did. There are several
signs that this danger is becoming increasingly real. The most important of these is the
apparent consensus on the reproductive health approach as the only effective approach to
population policy. 1982 PAA president John Kantner (cited in Greenhalgh 1996) wrote with
reference to the family planning movement of the 1960s: ‘Heady times, those, and something
in it for everyone—the activist, the scholar, the foundation officer, the globe-circling
consultant, the wait-listed government official’. It is difficult not to see an exact parallel with
the reproductive health agenda of today.
Not only have international organizations and funding agencies all changed their
mandates and their funding priorities to reflect this new paradigm shift in population policy,
national governments too have taken their cue from these changes and adopted what they call
a reproductive health approach  in an uncritically abrupt way. The giving up of demographic
targets is the most dramatic way in which this has occurred not only on a global scale (the
Cairo report is remarkable for its about-turn on the matter of population goals between the
second and third prepcoms, a switch too sudden to avoid the suspicion of political
expediency), but national governments too have thrown family planning programs and
personnel in some disarray by the sudden disavowal of demographic goals.
As in any discussion in which advocacy is a central feature, some of the discussion on the
new reproductive health agenda is general and some of it is focused; more distractingly, some
of it is clearly laid out but much of it is also ambiguous. In particular, it is ambiguous in its
use of language, as opposed to its policy prescriptions. The most common confusion within
the new IPM is that caused by the way it uses interchangeably the terms ‘health programs’,
‘family planning programs’ and ‘reproductive health programs’. It is never very clear whether
this interchangeability is taken to be a description of the situation in the field or refers to a
goal of the new paradigm that is being proposed.
Moreover, the use of language by the new population literature and reproductive health
rhetoric is infectious. Virtually any agency, governmental or non-governmental, today brings
the term ‘reproductive health’ into its agenda whether or not it is in context. Population-
related agencies are of course the worst offenders: either they have replaced the word
‘population’ with ‘reproductive health’, a clear case of category mistake; or, if they are bold
or unwise enough to continue to harp on ‘population’ issues, they have appended the term
‘reproductive health’ to any use of the word ‘population’4.
                                                
2
 I use the acronym IPM to refer not only to the international population movement but also often to the
international reproductive health movement (for which the population movement is increasingly a
proxy) and sometimes to the international women’s movement (for which the population movement in
increasingly the spokesperson).
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 This critique of the old style of population policy was incidentally not wholly a critique from the
outside; the issues from the 1980s of any population research journal are replete with attempts to reframe
the population issue and question some of the basic assumptions of population policy.
4
 A March 1997 news release from the Population Council in its announcement of a new centre ‘to study
African population issues’ then immediately covers itself in the first sentence by stating that the centre
has been established to foster research ‘on population and reproductive health issues’. The body of the
announcement however does not mention reproductive health at all and makes it clear that the centre’s
primary interest will be in understanding the mechanics of demographic transitions in sub-Saharan
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In spite of such dangers and confusions, the new  changes in policy direction may of
course be empirically and theoretically justified if put to the test. But they do need to be put to
the test and supported with a wider range of research. This research currently is too one-sided
and geared to supporting reproductive health policy in the same way that earlier research was
geared to supporting family planning policy. Just as this body of research tended to be
unmindful of the larger social and political context of reproduction, the wholesale embrace of
the reproductive health agenda also requires such neglect of the larger context of fertility, an
understanding of which is crucial for academic understanding of reproduction of course, but
also for framing policies which do not universalize the experiences of Third World women or
of societies 5.
And in the same way as earlier, this new research can be best strengthened not by doing
more of the same but by subjecting  to critical scrutiny four aspects of itself: (1) the way it
formulates the ‘population problem’; and the validity of its recommendations from the
standpoint of (2) empirical justification of its hypotheses; (3) ethical rationales; and (4)
feasibility. None of these critical approaches need be undertaken in the spirit of destroying the
reproductive health approach to population policy; instead they must be seen as a means of
clarifying and strengthening a population policy which continues to be explicitly based on an
ideology of promoting human rights, reproductive rights and social welfare.
In the following sections I outline the possible framework of such a critique. Three things
that this framework does not do are worth mentioning. First, it does not dwell too much on the
positive features of the new IPM; these are already well known and widely acknowledged
even by the staunchest advocates of traditional population policy. Secondly, this framework is
often unable to go beyond research recommendations to actually discuss findings. This
inability is an outcome of the continuing politicization of population research and policy; we
simply do not know enough about  the limitations of the new IPM because we have not thus
far found it politically or financially feasible to explore these limitations6. And finally, this is
not a framework for dissecting the social and political construction of demographic
                                                                                                                               
Africa to initiate policies to sustain or accelerate such transitions. This is a perfectly legitimate research
activity and little is gained by the political acknowledgment of reproductive health issues out of context.
The Indian government in the  latest version of its population policy, which is shortly to be placed before
Parliament, talks of a reproductive health package which will include also the national eradication of
malaria, leprosy, tuberculosis, blindness and AIDS (Economic and Political Weekly 1997). Quite apart
from the confusion implied by such indiscriminate use of terms with very specific meanings, there is the
very real fear that language will become a political substitute for action.
5
 In a recent issue of the New York Times , there was a long article on the position of the National
Organization of Women on the presence of an all-girls school in Queens. In spite of many students and
alumnae testifying that the school served an essential educational purpose because it catered to girls
from the kind of cultural background which made learning in the presence of boys difficult, NOW
insisted that the school be made co-educational because as, its spokesperson explained, NOW wanted to
be consistent about its stand on equal access to schools. What this approach lacks is what Sen (1970)
calls the distinction between ‘basic’ and ‘non-basic’ value judgements. It treats equal access to schools
as a basic value (that is, a value which is adhered to under all conceivable circumstances), instead of
modifying this principle when an unseen contingency occurs to now propose for example, that equal
access is a non-basic value judgement, and advancing the education of girls is the basic value judgement.
6
 Even when some of the potential criticisms of the new  population policy approach are acknowledged,
they are rarely explicitly addressed. For example, Sen, Germain and Chen (1994a) in their introductory
chapter to an influential report on the new approach, clearly mention some of the criticisms of this
approach; but the next paragraph, which is presumably an attempt to rebut some of these criticisms, goes
off on a tangent, not taking any of these criticisms specifically into account. In any case, possibly for
strategic reasons, these criticisms of the reproductive health agenda are becoming increasingly muted.
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knowledge and policy, an area on which there is a slowly emerging but penetrating literature
(see Greenhalgh 1996), but for exploring the validity of the policy outcomes of this
construction.
However, not all of this criticism requires basic research; existing research in mainstream
population studies can often be profitably reviewed and re-evaluated to feed into it even if it
true that this research was motivated by more than academic interest7. In addition, basic
demography is very good at accounting procedures which greatly simplify many of the more
theoretical arguments. But, for strategic reasons, this review and re-evaluation does need to be
undertaken by the IPM itself; when such a review throws up unexpected or even
uncomfortable findings, at least it cannot be accused of the hawkish motivational biases that
the old IPM is seen to have in the popular imagination8.
Three years after Cairo, it makes sense to assert that the new IPM has come of age and
needs the criticism that will keep it on its toes. Such introspection is essential if the new IPM
is not to fall prey to the dogmatism that it has accused the older IPM of sinking into, even if
this time it is dogmatism with a human face.
Formulation of the problem
The reproductive health approach cannot be faulted as an approach to the problems of
reproductive health, especially among women, and in its goal of responding sensitively to
these problems. However, since it has been set in the context of population policy and not
health policy, it owes itself a clearer stand on the population question and a more detailed
consideration of the implications of the reproductive health approach to this stand. Three
related questions may be asked in this context: is there a reproductive health problem that
needs interventions? Is there a population or excess-fertility ‘problem’ that could benefit from
interventions? Is the population problem synonymous with the reproductive health problem or
is the reproductive health problem a subset of the population problem?
On the first question, the reproductive health lobby has provided the information and the
arguments for a strong affirmative answer which few could challenge. Even the most tentative
numbers suggest that the reproductive health problem is worthy of much discussion. But on
the next two questions, much remains to be learned. One may deduce the position of the
international health movement on the importance of slower population growth as a
worthwhile goal from two sources: from the statements made on this matter and, perhaps
more importantly, from the statements not made.
The international women’s movement which determined so much of the Cairo
deliberations has never been very explicit about its own position on the population and
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 At the same time there is a great need to draw inspiration from research which is not guided or
motivated by policy considerations. As Greenhalgh (1996) highlights, such research which is divorced
from policy motives tended to be sidelined by funding agencies and political exigencies, therefore often
by population scientists; however, there is still a substantial body of knowledge, especially in the
neighbouring disciplines of anthropology and history, which can inform the policy process in a more
rounded way, because it is concerned with the larger political and social context of individual behavior.
8
 The politics of population policy continue to plague the discourse of the new IPM in much the same
way as they did the old. Unsubstantiated allegations of ulterior motives are still common. For example,
see the remark in Sen (1994) that in the face of the reproductive health challenge, the old population
‘establishment’, while seeking more and more official funds for family planning, continues to argue that
‘such funds should only be used for contraception (rather than reproductive health more integrally)’ and
that this population establishment also argues that ‘worrying about the quality of family planning
services is an unaffordable luxury in a time of financial stringency’ (p.68). It would be extremely
difficult to find any individual or agency today callous or foolhardy enough to say the latter in particular.
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development debate. It never agreed very clearly with the orthodox position that
contemporary developing countries have much to gain from a reduction in their population
growth rates, which, given the universal goal of continued mortality decline, means a
reduction in current fertility levels. However, and this is significant, it has never explicitly or
implicitly challenged this viewpoint either9. This is surprising, given that one of the most
powerful criticisms of  family planning programs could be that they are an aberration in a
world which needs or wants high fertility. But the developments leading up to and after the
Cairo conference did not throw up any variants of Mahmood Mamdani or Julian Simons, and
the mainstream women’s movement did not even exploit the possibilities available in
academic ‘revisionism’, which believes that population growth is a neutral factor in economic
and social development. Either of these approaches would have given much greater
legitimacy to a population policy entirely in a reproductive rights and reproductive health
framework.
However, it is of course also possible that the silence is because population goals are
irrelevant to the priorities of the international reproductive health movement. That is, the only
reason the reproductive health approach entered the population policy debate is because
traditional population policy has been inimical to reproductive health. If that is the case, the
international population movement (which then cannot be synonymous with the international
women’s movement or the international reproductive health movement) needs to heed this
criticism, but also needs to define its own position on the population question. There is
nothing inherently abusive or intrusive about demographically driven population policy, and a
concern for reproductive health can be quite consistent with a simultaneous concern with
larger questions of interventions to encourage fertility decline. But given that there will still
remain much scope for debating the borderlines between population policy and reproductive
health policy, the ideal situation would be for the international women’s movement in
reproductive health to develop its own version of legitimate population goals which can then
be meshed into the larger population goals of countries10.
Thus far, the pointers suggest that the international women’s and reproductive health
movement may not be in major disagreement with the old IPM’s assessment that fertility
decline is a worthwhile goal at the individual level and perhaps also at the societal level. Its
disinclination to actively oppose this viewpoint is one such pointer. More tellingly, the few
statements that have been made on this matter usually fall in the category of statements which
agree that fewer births in the developing world might be a good thing for all concerned: see,
for example, the January 1995 issues of the National Times, the official publication of the
National Organization for Women. Such agreement is also indicated by the volume of writing
that adds that a reproductive health approach will also reduce fertility.
This implicit agreement may sometimes be motivated by strategic concerns: McIntosh
and Finkle (1995) suggest that it made it easier for the women’s movement in Cairo  to gain
allies from sympathetic population and family planning agencies; at a subregional level such
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 It has rightly challenged the position that population growth is  the key issue in development and social
welfare; but it has not openly questioned whether it is a key issue.
10
 For example, the IPM may take the stand that local demographic goals, which often characterized the
target approach in the Indian family planning program, need to be replaced by fertility and mortality
goals which are determined for much larger units such as the state, as well as at the national level.
Indeed, the Cairo document does agree that demographic goals may ‘legitimately be the subject of
government development strategies’(United Nations 1994). But then it sidelines criticism by leaving
fertility goals completely out of its later recommendations for time-bound goals in population policy. It
is then hardly surprising that in practice, a dissatisfaction with local targets seems to have resulted in a
discarding of any kind of fertility goals in newer national policies.
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agreement may be exploited to get greater official support for some of the non-demographic
goals of the women’s movement (Basu 1997a); but it may more often be genuine. Whatever it
is, and together with its internal disagreements, the current position of the reproductive health
movement on the population issue needs to come out of the closet. Indeed, an airing of some
of the internal disagreements on this question will go far towards making it more robust and
legitimate.
Given the pointers mentioned above and given the academic literature which tilts in the
direction of favouring lower fertility even when it is motivated by concerns about individual
rights and not larger political or economic interests, it is likely that when pressed, the IPM too
will be on the side of the lower-fertility lobby. It may take its cue from the organizer of the
Cairo conference, the UNFPA, which while wholeheartedly accepting the reproductive health
approach, still slips in the phrase ‘the universally accepted goal of population stabilization’ in
its endorsement of this approach (UNFPA 1996)11. It could get a stronger cue from the inter-
agency task force of the United Nations which, being only slightly less constrained by the
Cairo ideology, goes as far as to reiterate the need to continue ‘efforts to slow population
growth’ (United Nations 1996).
National governments too, whatever their rhetoric at international conferences12, have
been on the whole very conscious of the benefits of lower population growth rates for  their
countries. But, given the speed with which many national governments have dropped
population stabilization goals from their population policies after Cairo, the reproductive
health movement may be forgiven for being more cynical about the pre-1994 pronouncements
of governments in both the developed and developing world on these matters. However, even
if political expediency is a hallmark of government pronouncements, joint statements from
developing countries, such as the Bali Declaration on Population and Sustainable
Development (1992) and the Non-Aligned Summit on Population and Development (1992), as
well as the planning documents of developing countries, nevertheless provide a useful
framework for understanding these countries’ own perceptions of population issues, even if
these tend to be coloured by the developed-country viewpoint. Moreover, at least some
national governments, India in particular, were concerned about population growth issues well
before these became internationally fashionable13. Others, China in particular, continue to
commit themselves to active efforts to reduce fertility in defiance of the Cairo coyness on the
question and under the Cairo statement on protection of the principle of national sovereignty.
In addition to all these official pronouncements, the pre-1994 research output in the area
of population and development has much to offer to the women’s and reproductive rights
                                                
11
 The UNFPA is also careful in its use of language. While it avoids espousing fertility goals, it does not
abandon them completely. The report of its Secretary General on the progress in implementing the Cairo
plan of action states that ‘population issues are more than just demographic concerns’ (Sadik 1996); that
is, it does not exclude demographic concerns. This statement is similarly vague in its use of population
policy terminology; while its reference to the importance of ‘population information, education and
communication’ can be read as consistent with the reproductive health program agenda because it could
include mechanical information about contraception and health matters, it can equally well be read as a
continued endorsement of active efforts to motivate fertility decline.
12
 In fact, at the plenary session of the Cairo conference, this rhetoric was strongly in the direction of
concern about their population growth, a concern that was mirrored in the speeches of representatives
from the developed countries, but which disappeared completely from the final program of action
produced from the conference.
13
 Indeed, in spite of the scrapping of demographic targets in India since April 1997, the new minister
for health and family planning has reiterated her commitment to reduced population growth and recently
even went as far as to propose a new slogan, ‘One is Fun’. Needless to say, this slogan is unlikely to
catch on.
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activist; it has even more to offer to the human rights activist. But this does not mean an
uncritical acceptance of the pro-fertility-decline position. In particular, there may be a case for
acknowledging the views of the revisionists (as exemplified in the National Academy of
Sciences report of 1986) and perhaps even of the pro-growth group. While the revisionist
position may be as politically motivated as the alarmist position, its empirical evidence cannot
be simply ignored and calls for a fresh attempt to reconcile its stance with the antinatalist
stance of policy and popular views about population growth in developing countries14. Here
again beginnings have been made in population studies (e.g. McNicoll 1995) which suggest
new ways of re-examining the revisionist position15. Some recent empirical research even
ventures to suggest that the Coale and Hoover model of population and development linkages
may be respectable after all (Higgins and Williamson 1997).
In any case, the population control establishment has in recent years made quite a strong
case for reduced fertility from the standpoint of individual women, children and families
(National Academy of Sciences 1991; Lloyd 1993), whether the outcome measure is health,
education, intra-family discrimination, or, paradoxically, women’s status itself (Dixon-
Mueller 1994) or even reproductive health itself (Caldwell 1997). But here again, some of the
findings may not be as generalizable as they are made out to be by those in favour of fertility
control and the IPM needs to sift the evidence. For example, adolescent fertility may be less
bad for women and children in situations where it is socially sanctioned and supported by
family networks than where it is a feature of the socio-economically most deprived (National
Academy of Sciences 1993; Basu 1997b).
It may well be that the reproductive health movement will be swayed by such case-study
considerations to decide that fertility reduction is not a universally16 useful social goal, in
which case it will have to remain as a watchdog of those who think it is useful, and still re-
evaluate the place of reproductive health policy in overall health policy. Alternatively, it may
decide that it is not a goal that needs active chasing because all indicators are that the fertility
transition is on course worldwide. While it is true that fertility decline does appear to be a
feature of many parts of the developing world, this stand will need to take into account the
fact that minor differences in the pace of fertility decline or the level at which fertility
stabilizes can lead to drastic differences in final population numbers. For example, Bongaarts
and Amin (1997) estimate that if India’s fertility stabilizes at half a birth above replacement
this will result in a population with over a billion more individuals in the year 2100 than if it
stabilizes at replacement level.
If pressed, it is on the whole likely that the new IPM will endorse the value of a more
rapid  reduction in fertility in the developing countries. In that case, the policy implications
which follow need a re-evaluation. In the spirit of the reproductive health critiques of
traditional family planning programs, the reproductive health approach needs to develop its
own internal critiques which take fertility goals into account and which also elaborate on the
substantive, ethical and feasibility aspects of its recommendations. To begin this, the IPM
needs to call for more research on the rationale for encouraging lower fertility. If this rationale
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 A report by 58 National Science Academies a few years later (Science Summit 1994), on the other
hand, states unequivocally that ‘humanity’s ability to deal successfully with its social, economic and
environmental problems will require the achievement of zero population growth within the lifetime of
our children’.
15
 In addition, the IPM may well have to turn upon itself its old criticism of universal population and
family planning goals and acknowledge that the population problem takes different forms and is
differently important in different settings; in which case the policy implications which follow will also
have to be suitably disaggregated rather than set from above by the IPM.
16
 By ‘universal’ I refer of course to the universe of developing countries, not the world as a whole.
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is entirely based on individual welfare and rejects the possibility of externalities, then the
ethical policy prescriptions which follow will have to be weaker. The costs of population
growth to collective welfare are not at all settled in the academic literature; yet their
estimation, at regional and subregional levels, has profound implications for what
interventions are ethically permissible (see Hardin 1968).
The next three sections suggest some ways in which these critiques may be developed by
those sympathetic to the reproductive health approach in principle.
Population and reproductive health policy: substantive issues
If the goal of population stabilization is treated as legitimate as long as it does not impinge on
human rights and reproductive rights, then the question which follows is whether the
reproductive health approach (which includes female empowerment) to population policy  is
an appropriate or at least sufficient mechanism for achieving this goal, even if it is a necessary
component of a sensitive population policy. That is, can a reproductive health policy be
synonymous with population policy? This simple question hides many complications and
cannot be answered in the straightforward way suggested by the current politically correct
reproductive health approach. This section attempts to briefly untangle some of these
complications so that more realistic responses to the question can be generated.
A part of the answer to this question hinges on what the IPM sees a reproductive health
program as doing. To paraphrase the most stringent demands made in the large volume of
writing on this subject, such a program should aim to help people enjoy sexual relations
without fear of infection, unwanted pregnancy or coercion; to regulate fertility without risk of
unpleasant or dangerous side-effects; to go safely through pregnancy and childbirth; and to
bear and raise healthy children. In addition, given all that was said at and after Cairo, one may
add the empowerment of women as an integral part of the reproductive health approach. This
is a tall order and it is not surprising that some effort is now being expended on developing
cost-conscious and feasible programs which prioritize some of these activities17.
In addition, in fairness to the old IPM, it must be acknowledged that family planning
programs and, especially, the Maternal and Child Health programs which later replaced them
in many countries, were in principle at least  aimed to address a substantial part of the
reproductive health agenda. They were less explicit in focusing on sexually transmitted
diseases and on sexuality, but the latter at least is a relatively recent concern even of the
feminist discourse, and MCH programs can be forgiven for not having adopted it.
In any case, in the context of a population policy which believes that fertility reduction is
a desirable outcome, can the reproductive health approach stand alone? Figures 1 and 2
present a framework for analysing the possible interventions to achieve a fertility decline, not
all of which can be an explicit part of population policy. Figure 1 represents a ‘supply’-
oriented approach to fertility decline which concentrates on satisfying what is now called the
‘unmet need’ for birth control. The contention of the reproductive health lobby is that a
reproductive health approach, while meeting the reproductive health needs of its clients, will
incidentally also reduce fertility significantly by mopping up this unsatisfied existing demand
for fertility control . For this contention, it draws on that part of the family planning literature
which justifies the existence of family planning programs even in the absence of other
changes or policies that reduce the ‘demand’ for children (e.g. Sinding, Ross and Rosenfield
1994). It distinguishes the reproductive health approach from the family planning approach in
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 As a ideal to strive for, there is no doubt that the reproductive health goal describes a very desirable
world, but it requires more attempts not only to prioritize its own sub-goals relative to one another
(which is currently being attempted), but also to prioritize its sub-goals relative to other health goals.
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providing a more comprehensive set of reproductive health services, but even more so in
terms of ideology; the reproductive health approach is structured around meeting client needs
while the old family planning approach is motivated by larger demographic concerns. But at
the operational level, if the family planning program does all that it is supposed to do, it seems
difficult to castigate it for also having its own internal population agenda, as long as this
agenda does not involve compromising any of its reproductive health goals. The crucial
operational difference is that family planning programs have traditionally been sidetracked by
their demographic objectives into compromising these reproductive health goals; but this is
not necessary.
Figure 1
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Potential impact on fertility
Figure 2
Factors which change the ‘Demand’ for children
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The question then is, will a reproductive health program lead to significant reductions in
fertility without additional developments or interventions? This question has two parts: is the
level of unmet need really everywhere large enough to lead to levels of fertility that now seem
desirable if it is satisfied? And is all unmet need amenable to fulfilment by a reproductive
health approach? On the first part, all the evidence suggests that there is no universal answer
and in many parts of the world the level of unmet need may still be too low to lead to
sufficient falls in fertility if this need is met. For example, Bongaarts and Bruce (1994)
document an unmet need level of about 23 per cent for sub-Saharan Africa, but even if this
were met, contraceptive prevalence would rise to only about 40 per cent, a level not high
enough to reduce total fertility rates to anywhere near replacement levels. On the other hand,
the Asian countries in their sample have much lower levels of unmet need and even satisfying
77 per cent of need may not be enough to pull fertility sufficiently low. It may be that the
reproductive health approach itself will increase the demand for contraception as unmet need
is fulfilled because it will also in the process reduce some of the other barriers to demand,
infant and child mortality in particular. But a careful reading of the various documents leading
up to the Cairo conference suggests that even at full efficiency, that is, by meeting all the
requirements of a good reproductive health policy, population growth goals can only be met if
the goals themselves are revised downwards. This pragmatic consideration probably lies
behind  UNFPA’s subtly changing messages:  at the second prepcom it called for efforts to
realize the low-fertility projections of the United Nations, but at the time of the third prepcom
it stated that a good reproductive health program had the potential to keep population numbers
below the medium-level projections.
Regarding the second part of the question above, it may be reframed as: is lack of  access
to safe and effective contraceptives the only barrier to contraceptive use by those sexually
active persons who ‘do not want another child (ever or in the near future) but are still not
using any effective contraception’? There is a large and growing literature, some of it very
technical, on the concepts, measurement and meaning of unmet need and on its potential for
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reducing fertility (Westoff and Pebley 1981; Westoff 1988; Bongaarts 1990, 1991; DeGraaf
and de Silva 1996; DHS surveys); the IPM should use this research to guide discussions on
unmet need which are less universally framed. Given the fact that countries with different
levels of contraceptive use are distinguished by much more than the nature of their family
planning programs, the reproductive health movement should perhaps not resort to blanket
assertions about the potential for its approach to reduce fertility.
In particular, we need much more information on the meaning of ‘unmet need’ not in
terms of its technical calculations, but in terms of what it says about the women it refers to.
Analysis of DHS data which looks at why women who do not want another child are not
using contraception (e.g. Bongaarts and Bruce 1994) suggests that it is not usually a question
of simple ‘access’ to contraceptive services, but has more to do with lack of information about
contraception and fears, legitimate as well as unfounded, about the health risks associated
with various methods of birth control. Both these gaps can presumably be filled by a good
reproductive health program, but such a program is unlikely to be able to deal with the 50 per
cent of unmet need that seems to result from larger institutional and social factors that the
DHS surveys capture very imperfectly by categorizing these into the stock variables of
religion, fatalism and ‘husband’s disapproval’. These factors do not elucidate the validity of
responses about intentions to bear another child (how much of this response is an outcome of
politeness for example) and the intensity of wanting no more children. ‘Where there’s a will,
there’s a way’ seems to be a proverb well supported by the historical experience of fertility
decline at least.
A well implemented reproductive health program can certainly go a long way in
promoting reproductive health and incidentally promoting fertility decline18. But unless it is
combined with a strategy to actually decrease the demand for children, either through the
reproductive health program itself or through other changes or interventions in people’s lives,
it is unlikely to meet population growth goals as well. Incidentally, this is even more a
criticism of the family planning program approach to fertility reduction (see Pritchett 1994).
But its application to the reproductive health agenda also hinges on what the ‘IEC’ activities
of the reproductive health program (activities which the Cairo statement does promote) are
agreed to constitute. If these are confined to providing the information needed to meet
individual fertility goals but do not actually try to influence these fertility goals through a
campaign of information about the benefits of lower fertility, then they may be seen as
focusing on the supply-side aspects of contraception. But if they actually encourage greater
fertility control, then they fall into the set of factors that influence ‘demand’ as discussed
below. But the stand of the new IPM on this issue is not clear.
Figure 2 presents three categories19 of factors which can conceivably change fertility
through changing the costs and benefits of childbearing, in other words, the ‘demand’ for
children; and the two routes through which these factors can have their effect. Most of the
literature on the determinants of fertility change can fit into this framework. Both the old and
the new IPMs are agreed that economic and social development broadly defined (Box A,
Figure 2) can alter the balance of costs and benefits of children in the direction of a lower
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 This decline can be achieved not only through increasing effective access to safe contraception, but
also through reducing the high levels of child loss which prevail in much of the developing world and
which are hypothesized to lead to a desire for higher fertility, even at constant completed family sizes. In
addition, a significant negative effect on fertility is likely if the Cairo call for easier and safer access to
abortion services is heeded. But it is also possible that a good reproductive health program will increase
fertility through increasing fecundity as maternal and sexual health improves. Needless to say that is a
benefit that no population goal can compromise.
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 These categories and these routes are of course much more overlapping than the boxes imply.
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demand for children. While state policy does affect the pattern and pace of development,
which in turn influence the costs and benefits of childbearing, these policies need not be state-
driven and, moreover, it is difficult to know exactly how these policies and events at the
macro-level impinge on fertility decisions at the micro-level.
But boxes B and C in Figure 2 have greater policy relevance and contain many things
besides family planning and reproductive health services. The IPM needs to grapple with
some of their contents to develop a position on the role and validity of interventions to reduce
the demand for children. The new IPM has focused so exclusively on one of the possible
interventions, the empowerment of women,  that it has failed to address two related questions.
First, is the empowerment of women a sufficient way to reduce the demand for children? And
second, is the empowerment of women the only effective way to reduce fertility?
To begin with the second question, one way of looking at interventions which may reduce
fertility (that is, reduce the demand for children) would be to categorize these interventions
into those which target fertility directly and those which influence fertility through means that
are not directly related to fertility. The former may be called explicit fertility policy, the latter
implicit fertility policy. The latter may be undertaken for their presumed fertility-reducing
effects (but they may also be motivated by concerns that have nothing to do with fertility
reduction); but  involve interventions which drastically change other aspects of life as well.
That is, implicit policy is implicit only insofar as it does not involve actually being tied to a
fertility goal or making prescriptions about family size even when it includes an underlying
demographic agenda. In this sense, my use of the term is different from that of Johansson
(1992) who refers to implicit population policy as that which is not consciously driven by
demographic concerns. But the policies that make up implicit population policy are the same
in both cases.
Another major difference between the two sets of potential interventions may be found in
the way they change the costs and benefits of children. Implicit fertility policy increases the
costs, or decreases the benefits, of all children, so that the higher the fertility, the higher the
total costs in a simple multiplicative way. Explicit fertility policy on the other hand imposes
higher costs on specific births, for example, higher order-births or births to teenage mothers,
so that lower fertility is associated with lower per capita costs of children.
Some examples are in order here. Through implicit fertility policy, the costs and benefits
of children can change in the direction of all children becoming more expensive by a variety
of changes in social and economic circumstances20. These include compulsory education, an
effective ban on child labour, and increases in women’s participation in the labour force, in
the desire for material goods, and in parental aspirations for children. All such interventions
work by increasing the direct and opportunity costs of children and/or reducing the benefits of
children. Note that these changes may be structural or they may be ideological, as the
intermediate level in Figure 2 suggests. Johansson (1992) stresses one aspect of the latter, the
imposition of an ideology of ‘parental altruism’ whereby the intergenerational flow of
resources is reversed in the direction of parents to children; this is a state-sponsored version of
Caldwell’s (1977 ) intergenerational wealth flows hypothesis, in which the reversal of flows
may be instigated by agencies or events other than the state. In an ideal situation, such
imposed parental altruism which increases the costs of high fertility should be accompanied
by a parallel ‘state altruism’ which reduces the costs of low fertility.
Compulsory universal primary or even secondary schooling, as opposed to mere
increased access to schooling or greater investments in female education, provides a good
example of implicit population policy. There is much evidence that by increasing the costs of
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 Many of these changed circumstances are similar to those resulting from natural, that is, not policy-
induced, social and economic change of the kind captured in Box A in Figure 20.
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children at the same time that it decreases their benefits, mass schooling may be a major route
to fertility decline (Caldwell 1980). It may also be viewed as one way for families to get out
of the poverty trap imposed by illiteracy and low skills and is indeed called for today as an
essential investment in human resources. At the same time, given the theoretical reasons for
high fertility which hinge on the economic value of children, compulsory schooling can be
viewed as an unethical burden on poor families. Obviously there are value judgements
involved in one’s stand on compulsory schooling, but on the whole even the liberal-egalitarian
position has not come out strongly against it. Instead the position is that such an intervention
is desirable but must be backed by services to reduce the immediate costs of low fertility and
of children being unable to contribute to family income in poor households.
Mention must also be made of the large and growing literature that suggests the important
role of non-structural changes which promote an ideology conducive to lower fertility . More
sophisticated and less Eurocentric versions of traditional diffusion theory (e.g. Cleland and
Wilson 1987; Bongaarts and Watkins 1996; Kreager forthcoming) and more pragmatic
experience with promoting the small-family norm through the mass media in many countries,
suggest that an antinatalist population policy can change voluntary reproductive behaviour
often without corresponding changes in the circumstances of people’s lives, including
women’s empowerment; in fact this new ideology may then change these structural
circumstances in addition to changing fertility. Where such ideology-changing approaches to
reproductive change fit into the agenda of the new IPM is an issue that needs much clearer
analysis. The role of such propagandist population policy is certainly not unproblematic,
especially when it functions through propagating the value of the increased consumerism that
fewer births can facilitate, thereby partly removing at least one environmental argument (that
of greater consumption of scarce resources) against high fertility.
On the other hand, explicit fertility policy changes the costs and benefits of the nth child
more than it does for children of birth order less than n. Thus, it may not allow free education
or health care for children of third and higher-order births; or it may bar parents of more than
three children from holding public office; or it may provide special incentives to parents of
two or three daughters who stop after three births. Such policies are not necessarily coercive;
that is, these are different from policies which directly enforce contraceptive acceptance, but
they tend to get lumped together in the literature.
The new IPM does not sufficiently address the potential effectiveness, ethics, or
feasibility of either of these classes of  interventions. While it considers interventions to
increase the status and empowerment of women (an intervention which is one of the several
possible in principle in Box B) as a necessary and essential responsibility of the state, the
underlying assumption in the IPM literature is that other kinds of interventions to reduce
fertility are intrusive and definitely not the hallmark of a benevolent state. This duality may
well be justified, but as yet we do not have much empirical evidence in either direction. The
new IPM needs to reopen the question of possible and unfeasible, effective and ineffective,
ethical and unethical interventions to reduce fertility, before it formally rejects, as opposed to
informally neglecting as is happening now, any of the possible explicit or implicit
interventionist routes to fertility decline. And in each case, there is no doubt that an attempt
should be made to include the many, often unexpected ramifications of policy, and the many
ways what is effective, feasible and ethical in a laboratory setting may to be destructive in the
field.
The only internationally politically correct intervention to reduce fertility today—the
empowerment of women—is also too uncritically endorsed in the new population policy.
Taking the positive aspects of this intervention as given, I will turn to some of its more
doubtful features. The earlier paragraphs and Figure 2 have already indicated that from a
purely instrumental point of view, there are many other explicit and implicit interventions
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which can reduce fertility. This is not just theory; there is sufficient empirical evidence from
history (e.g. Johansson 1992) and from contemporary populations that female empowerment
is not a necessary condition for fertility decline21. The new IPM may then respond that it is
the only ethical intervention in the set of interventions covered in Boxes B and C in Figure 2.
Once possible interventions are seen in the framework of Figure 2 and of the last paragraph, it
is not clear that all the possible interventions in Boxes 2 and 3 can be dismissed as unethical.
Conversely, one may ask what women’s empowerment means; more importantly, how
automatic it is for the theoretical means of female empowerment to actually increase
empowerment, and how universal is the female demand for these means of empowerment.
These questions are not an attempt to promote the status quo, but to point out a crucial
problem with the interpretation of empirical findings. For example, after education, women’s
employment is the most routinely sought measure to improve women’s status; indeed it is
often considered superior to education in its potential for improving women’s lives (Sen,
Germaine and Chen 1994a); if women’s labour force participation rises, what criteria does
one use to judge if this is a positive development?  It may be a positive development for its
instrumental value in reducing fertility or even increasing autonomy, but that is not to say that
it is good in itself or good because it increases gender equality; both these considerations may
have less immediate value to the women who now get employment. The determinants of
happiness or even contentment are not universal and largely depend on the socio-cultural
context in which they are assessed; in addition, in many societies male employment is not at
all an attractive thing that women want to share, especially since they do not have the ‘wives’
at home to make life in the labour force more palatable. Several survey and anecdotal findings
support the assertion that economic activity is not a universally valued goal for women22.
Population and reproductive health policy: ethical issues
The new IPM has been devastatingly and effectively critical  of the ethical basis of the old
school of family planning-based population policy. This action was doubly important because
for the first time it opened up the question of the ethics of population policy in a systematic
way, earlier criticisms having been confined to complaints about specific excesses by family
planning programs. However, the new IPM’s interest in the ethical aspects of population
policy does not go far enough. In particular, it does not examine closely enough the many
ramifications of its own recommendations for policy.
Criticizing the critique of the old IPM is not the focus of this paper23; what is sought
instead is an analogous ethical critique of the new IPM. It is not necessary that this critique
will discredit the new IPM; what is needed is an open discussion of the many ethical
implications of the new population and reproductive health movement, that may be missed by
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 Indeed, real empowerment may well increase fertility after a point. This seems to be possible from the
finding in many parts of western Europe that there may be an ‘overmet demand’ for contraception, with
ideal family sizes often being higher than actual family sizes (Commission on the European
Communities 1990), and clear signs of a fertility increase in the country with the greatest gender
equality and female autonomy, Sweden.
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 Johansson (1992) suggests that it never was. In England and Wales for example, child labour was
seen as one way for women to leave the labour force and lead a better life.
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 But see Mason (1994) for a well reasoned response to the charge that family planning programs
violate human rights. Mason’s paper predates the Cairo conference but does not seem to have informed
the Cairo agenda. This neglect is consistent with McIntosh and Finkle’s (1995) contention that the
demographic input into the final Cairo meeting suddenly disappeared after having been a major
component of the preparations leading up to the meeting.
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an approach based largely on an anti-family-planning-program agenda. Some of these
implications as well as a large number of contending ethical approaches, in the context of
population policy in general and not specifically in the context of the new IPM, have been
well summarized by Bok (1994) in one of the most comprehensive and widely-cited
documents on the goals and methods of the new IPM, the volume edited by Sen, Germaine
and Chen (1994b). But the issues raised by Bok do not reappear  forcefully enough in the rest
of this document as contentious questions to be debated and discussed24; they do not even
appear in the introductory chapter summarizing the report. This silence may be read as a
continuing politicization of the population issue unless it is broken by debate from within the
IPM itself.
The development of an internal critique of the ethics of the new IPM requires the tools of
moral philosophy as well as of population studies. This is daunting, but not impossible, as
suggested by some recent attempts, most notably that by Sen (1994). This section introduces
just three interrelated areas of ethical conflict and ambiguity in the new IPM agenda which an
effective critique could begin by addressing. These three areas deal with the possible
confusions and tensions between (1) individual rights and individualism; (2) human rights and
women’s rights; and (3) voluntarism and coercion.
Individual rights and individualism
The language of the new IPM is surprisingly full of the unalienable rights and freedoms of
individuals, especially when women’s rights are being discussed. It is true that the Cairo
document and related publications often use the phrase ‘rights and responsibilities’, but the
only responsibilities that are spelled out are those to be assumed by the ‘other’: men, society
or the state; reproduction is treated as a private matter and since the act of reproduction is a
female activity, complete female autonomy is sought over this act. This is ironical because
one of the central tenets of feminism is that the personal is political and because, by
promoting the notion of inalienable autonomy, the IPM is legitimizing the very individualism
that it has historically contested . Not only is the ideology of individualism a Eurocentric
concept which non-European cultures may not necessarily endorse25, this ideology could
flourish historically only by placing large categories of individuals—slaves, women, the
poor—outside its pale. Once it is granted that all individuals have the same rights, the
ideology becomes very difficult to sustain without parallel notions of social obligations and
responsibilities. Not only are equality and autonomy not the same thing, complete equality
and complete autonomy cannot really go together.
Feminist criticisms of unrestricted free markets and the havoc they can cause can
plausibly be applied to the ideology of individualism in reproductive rights; in any event such
a criticism is worth discussing. This criticism has nothing to do with reinforcing the social
roles of women as daughters, wives and mothers. But it has much to do with acknowledging
                                                
24
 Correa and Petchesky (1994) in this volume carry some of the possible arguments much further, by
developing the useful notions of bodily integrity, personhood and equality as the foci of reproductive
rights. But there is still much scope for further thought on these matters, and in particular on the
distinction between reproductive rights and sexual rights. There is also a distinction between
reproductive rights and reproductive health rights which is not clearly specified in, for example, Boland,
Rao and Zeidenstein (1994).
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 Not endorsing a universal ideology of individualism is however not the same as not endorsing an
ideology of universal individual rights. As Sen (1997) explains, the frequently professed dichotomy
between Western values and what have been called ‘Asian’ values is not a real dichotomy; the concept
of some inalienable individual rights has existed at one time or another in all societies and often exists in
diverse forms even within any single homogeneous society.
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social organization (even if in a newer, more desirable form) in which individual freedoms
cannot exist without responsibilities to the collective. As a general, rather than a feminist
concept, individualism has been blamed for its tendency to encourage individuals to view
other human beings as mere obstacles in their path; and there is not much evidence that
women alone will not give in to this tendency because of their inherent caring abilities, or
because of their historical experience of oppression.
To return to the implications of the tension between individual rights and individualism
for an ethical population policy, the new IPM needs to explain much more clearly the
responsibilities that go with women’s reproductive rights. Rights to bodily integrity, including
protection from violence and from unwanted abortions or sterilizations, may be treated as
inalienable, and have been treated as inalienable even by the old IPM, even if they were
sometimes breached in the field; but it is difficult to make a case for absolute individual rights
over reproduction itself. And if freely chosen but ‘responsible reproduction’ is indeed the
goal, then policy needs some clearer guidelines on how it encourages such responsibility. The
reproductive health approach is silent on the role of the reproductive health program in
actively encouraging individuals to have fewer children, as opposed to merely providing the
services for birth control and informing them about the mechanics of safe and effective birth
control.
Quite apart from not acknowledging in its policy concerns that the state and society in
general may have a stake in reproduction, the new IPM approach emphasizes  antagonism
between men and women on reproductive matters more strongly than seems to be warranted
by the evidence. This focus on gender disagreements makes female martyrdom the
explanation for continuing high fertility in developing countries in the narratives of both the
old-style and the new IPMs. The old family planning literature, and some of the current
literature as well, assumed that there were significant differences between male and female
family size preferences and high fertility represented the dominance of the male preference.
But, since there is slender evidence to support this hypothesis (see Mason and Taj 1987; Basu
1992; Stycos 1996), more sophisticated analyses are concerning themselves with male-female
differentials in attitudes to contraception rather than to fertility (Biddlecom, Casterline and
Perez 1996); the implication is often that a significant part of the ‘unmet need’ for
contraception is due to male resistance to male and female contraception. But this assumption
needs to be examined further. It is not intuitively surprising that male and female fertility
goals may not be significantly different, since most motivations for high fertility apply to both
sexes; and it may well be that reported differences in attitudes to contraception are also more
subtle than they appear: after all, the unmitigated oppression of women and their forced
exposure to all the health risks of pregnancy and contraception impose costs on their husbands
and families as well.
In any case, it is agreed in the literature that quite apart from program implications, we
know very little about interpersonal differences in attitudes and preferences, and there is an
increasing sense from anthropological studies in the developing world that the marital
relationship is not one of universal discord. If the co-operative element of this relationship can
be highlighted as much as the antagonistic one, there may be more to gain strategically than a
persistent allusion to individual rights. In addition, this approach would make more ethical
sense because it would recognize many of the constraints on men and households, constraints
that are as institutionalized as the pressures on women to submit to patriarchy.
Human rights and women’s rights
Over the years, feminism has become a metaphor for a perspective that focuses on the needs
and problems of all vulnerable groups, not just women. But in the hands of the new IPM, the
feminist agenda has become more and more exclusively women-focused. Although the Cairo
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conference, and especially the Cairo statement, made token mention of the various
marginalized groups that a human rights approach to welfare must include, the subsequent
interpretation of this statement and attempts to implement it give the impression that women
are the only legitimate clients of a humane population policy.
Men in particular get unfairly left by the wayside in this new agenda (see Basu 1996).
The Cairo document is replete with references to men; indeed the draft document placed
before the third prepcom conference contained many ‘new issues’ related to men which its
cross-referencing had discovered were missing from the Mexico and Bucharest agendas (see
Johnson 1995); yet all these references are to the ‘responsibilities’ of men, and hardly ever to
their corresponding rights. Men are now expected to take greater responsibility for their
‘sexual and reproductive behaviour and their social and family roles’(para 4.25), and ‘to share
more equally in family planning, domestic and child-rearing activities and to accept the major
responsibility for the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases’ (para 7.8); while
‘reproductive health-care programs should be designed to serve the needs of women’ (para
7.7). Indeed, many commentators say that health  programs, not just reproductive health
programs, should be ‘women-centred’ (Ravindran 1995).
This unmitigated focus on women’s health, equality and empowerment  downplays the
very real health, equality and empowerment needs of poor, illiterate and unskilled men, who
are as marginalized by development and population policies as women; it also underestimates
the positive and co-operative aspects of gender relations in a way which not even the women
clients of the new IPM are likely to endorse. While gender-related violence and general
exploitation are certainly rife and need the kind of focus that the new IPM provides, at the
operational level there is much strategic and ethical sense in also focusing on class and other
distinctions that often cut across gender lines.
Other vulnerable groups should also be a more visible part of the new population policy
discourse: for example, the Women’s Declaration on Population Policies is surprisingly silent
on groups such as children and the old; but population policy needs to expand to consider the
rights of future generations as well. This is an issue on which the environmentalists and the
feminists have some disagreement, even if often superficial (Sen 1994), but a critique of the
new IPM would benefit from discussion on whether human rights should treat individuals as
‘tenseless’ (McNicoll 1995) and accord as much concern for the well-being of those to come
as for those already alive.
The new international population movement: a framework for a constructive critique    25
Supplement 2 to Health Transition Review Volume 7, 1997
Voluntarism and coercion
All current versions of the agendas of the IPM agree that any control of fertility must be
completely voluntary. But quite apart from the question of whose volition is respected given
the hypothesized intra-household conflicts on this matter, there is the deeper question of the
meaning of voluntarism and the role of population policy in promoting such voluntarism in
reproductive behaviour. When does population policy exceed its brief and become coercive?
Voluntary and coerced activity by individuals may be represented on a continuum depicted in
Figure 3 in the context of fertility behaviour in developing countries. Movement from one
state to the next (which is smooth and not discontinuous in the way depicted in the figure) as
well as entrenchment in any particular state may be facilitated by the events or interventions
listed in the boxes below the arrows before different states of voluntarism. The new IPM has
clarified, and almost all ideologies are agreed, that coerced fertility behaviour (position e)
should not exist. But state policy is not the only means of imposing such coercion26; as
evidenced by the growing numbers of female foeticides in many parts of Asia, families
themselves are not averse to coercive behaviour to achieve strategic demographic goals.
Figure 3
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A more relevant comment on Figure 3 is that while position (e) should not exist, position
(a), ‘pure’ voluntary behaviour, does not exist. Nor for that matter does position (b), which is
as far as the new IPM allows population policy to go. Even in the absence of explicit or
implicit population policy, reproductive behaviour is constrained in either direction by a
number of institutional, social and economic factors which determine the economic as well as
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 Indeed, Box (d) suggests that state policy may sometimes be unfairly blamed for such coercion: for
example, in India, the government’s goal of an NRR of one has been blamed for sex-selective abortions
because it allows each woman to have only one daughter (Menon 1993); this transposing of the concept
of the average number of  daughters per woman to the number of daughters desirable for each individual
woman is perhaps an unwelcome outcome of a welcome development, the increasing involvement in
population issues of lay advocacy groups, but such misunderstandings need monitoring because they are
so influential.
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non-economic costs and benefits of childbearing and children. Not all or even many of these
constraints are in the direction of promoting the welfare of all individuals and if fertility
reduction is agreed to be socially or individually desirable, then antinatalist population policy
may well be cast in the set of constraints that change the balance of incentives and
disincentives to reproduction in the direction of greater welfare. That is, population policy is
merely one of the many constraints on reproductive behaviour and to object to it on the
grounds that it constrains reproductive behaviour is to make an objection that trivializes the
other real and often much more insurmountable constraints on such behaviour. Indeed, well-
founded and altruistic population policy may reduce some of the other constraints on
reproductive choice (see Blake 1994[1972]).
This is an issue to be debated by the agencies and individuals involved in the new IPM,
not merely at an abstract philosophical level, but in terms of concrete proposals which are
permissible as being within the limits of acceptable state interventions. Usually these
interventions should have their own intrinsic justifications as well, for example interventions
to increase women’s education and empowerment, or to raise the legal minimum age at
marriage; but they may sometimes be purely instrumental as long as they do not transgress the
human rights agenda of the new IPM.
One possible framework within which possible interventions may be placed is described
below. This framework acknowledges that much of life is a series of compromises and then
seeks those interventions which minimize the harmful compromises. In addition, this
framework acknowledges that not all possible interventions are focused on women; there is
much that is feasible that has little bearing on women’s empowerment. In such a framework,
non-coercive possible interventions to reduce fertility may be overlappingly classified into
three groups: (1) interventions which enable low fertility27: these interventions are of course
the best among those possible in that they make it worthwhile for women and families to
reduce fertility because they remove some of the disincentives to low fertility and thus
encourage the positive ‘co-operation’ of people in fertility decline that Sen (1994), for
example, advocates. Measures in this category would include information and supplies for
safe and effective contraceptive use; education and other empowering tools for women;
greater investments in the health and survival of children; greater social security.
But such measures may often not be enough to dislodge the institutional, cultural and
economic constraints on low fertility, so that policy interventions may have to include (2)
measures which constrain high fertility: in this category would be largely those policies that
pass more and more of the costs of childbearing to parents or families themselves. More
selectively, they may pass on to families the costs of higher-order births. The ethics of both
these sets of disincentives to high fertility need to be debated, especially since they often
involve the welfare of children. In addition, constraints on high fertility may include implicit
policies such as those which increase the economic roles of women. While these may be
treated as ‘enabling’ interventions if they work through increasing the non-reproductive
options of women, the view of women’s employment that is usually assumed in the literature,
they may be viewed as ‘constraining’ interventions if they work for example by increasing the
incompatibility between women’s productive and reproductive roles.
(3) Interventions which are merely instrumental: policies which increase the costs of
childbearing and decrease its benefits but are difficult to define as being either benign or
restraining, because they have ambiguous consequences and because their effect on people’s
lives may change with time. These interventions include those that enforce compulsory
schooling for children or ban child labour. While such activities may eventually be seen as
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leading to conditions that enable low fertility, in the short run and in the absence of other
supports, they may just as well work only by constraining high fertility.
Population and reproductive health policy: feasibility issues
At one level, it is too soon yet to determine if the reproductive health approach is feasible or
not. There is now a massive effort under way to design and implement the new policy
(Pachauri 1995; National Academy of Sciences 1997); this effort is led by a consortium of
international research and funding bodies and local non-governmental organizations; national
governments seem to be still trying to make sense of the new paradigm and dealing with it in
a piecemeal, often largely rhetorical manner.
At the same time, there are a few feasibility issues that internal critiques of the new IPM
can address at this early stage. Most of them relate not so much to the costs of the new
approach as to who is to bear these costs. In particular, as Caldwell (1997) worries, there is
the strategic question of the readiness of donor governments to contribute heavily to programs
which do not directly serve their larger global interests. In addition, there is the question who
is to bear these costs in the climate of structural adjustment policies in many developing
countries, where there is an increasing tension between meeting welfare goals and offloading
government responsibility for individual welfare.
But there are also internal contradictions in the reproductive health agenda. Take the
question of contraceptive choice and availability in the reproductive health program. The new
IPM is insistent that women’s control over their reproductive capacities is essential and calls
for greater research into women-friendly contraception (Fathalla 1994); at the same time men
are to be encouraged to take much greater responsibility for contraception. In which direction
is policy to tilt?
The Cairo document, as opposed to a narrower reproductive health program which is
taken here to include the empowerment of women, is also problematic from the policy point
of view. In deference to multiple interests, it is dense in recommendations and diplomatically
says everything about everything; on this general tendency, see Demeny 1994. So it leaves
national governments to their own devices unless the IPM makes greater efforts to prioritize
issues, even if the reproductive health agenda gets first place.
Programs in the field also need to work out effective monitoring techniques. Although the
Cairo document specifies only the health goals for a new population policy, there is an
implicit and explicit assumption that the reproductive health agenda will also have a
significant demographic effect. The only real way to know this is to test for it and it is
essential that reproductive health programs include some fertility effect evaluation
component, even if the relative failure or slowness of this effect is not the decisive factor in
defining success. But as a research tool and to guide other aspects of population policy, such
evaluation has a major role.
Conclusion
This paper has not questioned the validity of and the need for the new agenda of the
international population movement. The politics that led to the development of this new
agenda can only be faulted for its motives at the margins; the bulk of the new program is
motivated, and, as importantly, seen to be motivated, by goals which are more often sensitive
to individual needs and human rights than earlier, more impersonal versions of population
policy in the developing world. In addition, by opening up the old IPM to critical academic
scrutiny, the reproductive health approach has forced a discussion of the meaning of
population policy and population research.
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However, the new population policy is itself now ripe for introspection, not about its
motives but about its practical recommendations and about its assessment of the population
‘problem’28. Such an internal critique, developed by the movement itself but drawing upon
the experience of mainstream population research and policy in a less one-sided way than
previously, can only strengthen the movement and refine its ability to match methods to goals.
In particular, this paper calls for an airing of the internal dissents within the movement.
While a public consensus was essential for strategic reasons at the time of the Cairo meeting,
open discussions of some of the dissatisfactions felt by individual agencies within the
movement will make it much more sensitive to local realities and increase its claims to
legitimacy in the long run.
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